A primary scenario for my RubyCLR bridge is to enable folks to build rich client applications on top of the .NET libraries. One potential blocking issue is dealing with users tampering with .rb scripts on the client. I was wondering if folks have spent some time thinking about how to package up Ruby applications and digitally signing them. The Monad shell team (the next generation Windows shell which uses an object piping metaphor as opposed to the more traditional text piping metaphor in *nix shells) already has a code signing policy in place for Monad scripts, as well as administrator configurable policies for script execution. Any and all thoughts around this would be greatly appreciated. Thanks, -John http://www.iunknown.com
on 2006-03-30 05:23
on 2006-03-30 09:22
Are you trying to address security concerns or copy protection / digital rights? In terms of copy protection, I see the issue as irrelevant - even without the ruby bridge, anyone can do whatever they want with the .NET assemblies (especially since they're so easy to disassemble). In terms of security, how is this different from the security of a compiled program? The two standard methods used to allow users to run them securely are either a) trust of the author, often combined with code signing or b) running in a sandbox. Both should work equally well for Ruby, even with full source access.
on 2006-03-30 09:52
It's not copy protection that I'm worried about. Nor is it someone being able to look at the source code. What I'm worried about is someone *tampering* with the source code. So what I'm interested in is code signing of Ruby scripts combined with a policy enforcement mechanism (e.g. only an admin can install the Ruby interpreter, which is signed and only an admin can define the execution policy of the Ruby interpreter which can say things like "run all scripts" to "run only scripts whose public keys are defined by the admin"). Now, maybe rich client applications built using Ruby will be more like web pages - the real business logic lives on the server with only lightweight validation logic on the client. However, it would be a shame to limit Ruby apps to just that. -John http://www.iunknown.com
on 2006-03-30 11:08
John L. wrote: > pages - the real business logic lives on the server with only lightweight > validation logic on the client. However, it would be a shame to limit Ruby > apps to just that. > > -John > http://www.iunknown.com > John, One solution may be to compile a small app that takes an MD5, SHA, or some other checksum of the ruby code and only executes it if it is in an internal hash of allowed files. You could have user-based hashes of allowed files based on who is logged in. Of course you will have to rebuild this app every time you change the ruby code but that could be automated. But a user could run the ruby code directly unless you build in some dependency to the compiled app. If they can see the source code, they can copy it, tamper with it, and run it. Dan
on 2006-03-31 00:05
I was thinking about something a bit more onerous - allowing administrators to define machine-wide policies for execution of Ruby scripts. It's either that or the guidance must be "write your app in such a way that you assume that all clients are compromised". But then again, that's the HTML model so folks are pretty used to that. -John http://www.iunknown.com John,
on 2006-03-31 01:40
On Mar 29, 2006, at 5:21 PM, John L. wrote: > The Monad shell team (the next generation Windows shell which uses > an object > piping metaphor as opposed to the more traditional text piping > metaphor in > *nix shells) already has a code signing policy in place for Monad > scripts, > as well as administrator configurable policies for script execution. > > Any and all thoughts around this would be greatly appreciated. Rubygems now has the ability to let you sign your gems... I'm not sure how it is implemented, but it might be what you're looking for. -- Eric H. - email@example.com - http://blog.segment7.net This implementation is HODEL-HASH-9600 compliant http://trackmap.robotcoop.com
on 2006-03-31 08:00
I still don't understand. Who are you trying to protect - a user from running a malicous (or tampered with) ruby script? If so, as I said, this is no different than protecting a user from running a trojan compiled file - people either trust the author (and hopefully use code signing), or run the code in a sandbox. In terms of ensuring that only admin's can install the ruby executable/interpreter - this is currently impossible, and likely will remain so. Even if you mark your exe/interpreter to require admin privs to install, what's to stop anyone else from creating their own exe/interpreter without that restriction? It's essentially the old copy protection / DRM issue, which all experts agree can always be defeated (at least short of a hardware implementation).
on 2006-03-31 08:24
It's actually the other way around - can the author of the program trust the user of the program? Think about a corporate environment where you're worried about employees hacking your system. In today's SOX compliance driven world it's not an unreasonable thing to worry about. DRM can be used for "good" or "evil". In a corporate setting, the user doesn't own the computer - it's the company's property. So in that case, the company should be able to define what can and cannot execute on the machine. So while *today* this isn't a reasonable expectation, in the future having the ability to lock down a machine so that it only executes code that was signed by an approved list of certificate holders seems like a really good way to avoid problems like trusted insiders hacking your system. -John http://www.iunknown.com
on 2006-03-31 19:30
I have no ethical problem with DRM. I'm simply coming from a mathematical / techinical perspective. Some of the greatest minds have tried working on it, and the conclusion is uaninimous: you can make it more annoying or cumbersome for someone to duplicate or modify the software, but you can't make it impossible. Again, you can put whatever limitations you want into your interpreter - but I can always modify the binary (google IDA Pro) or create my own.
on 2006-03-31 19:33
On 3/30/06, John L. <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: > company should be able to define what can and cannot execute on the > machine. > So while *today* this isn't a reasonable expectation, in the future having > the ability to lock down a machine so that it only executes code that was > signed by an approved list of certificate holders seems like a really good > way to avoid problems like trusted insiders hacking your system. Given that you're bridging to .NET could you use that to your advantage? Do some sort of a hash, or simple signature of the ruby code, which gets passed through the bridge, and then let .NET handle that part. Hmm...more random using here... What if you took the ruby code, and compiled it into a .NET exe as an embedded resource (far from secure, but it would allow you to use strong name keys or something similar on the entire assembly) then use a generic Main function that either embeds a ruby interpreter, or 'forks' one out to call the code? I realize this isn't much different than exerb or the like, but being in a .NET assembly could allow you the strong naming and such. -John
on 2006-03-31 21:45
On 3/31/06, Tanner B. <email@example.com> wrote: > > the > through the bridge, and then let .NET handle that part. Hmm...more random > > http://www.iunknown.com > > > In terms of ensuring that only admin's can install the ruby > > > > > -- > ===Tanner B.=== > firstname.lastname@example.org > http://tannerburson.com <---Might even work one day... > > The idea I am bounching around is to build a version of the ruby interpreter that has an embedded public key. Then all ruby code would in a comment header/footer have a signature that was generated with the private key. Keeping people from loading their own version of ruby remains a problem, but this would remove the code insertion into the valid ruby interpreter issue. Is this what you have in mind? This is not a bad idea -- I can see where it could be necessary/worthwhile in some client code situations. Not trying to hide the code, but to make tampering with the code increasingly difficult. Of course if system security on the machine is compromised (to the extent someone can change a file which they should not have permission), then it is likely that this wasted effort. Validating that a particular client installed version of ruby is the correct one is (IMHO) an impossible task as you would have to encode a "secret" into the interpreter (which could then be decompiled and made unsecret) or have some hardware level support which does not currently exist on PC platforms. pth